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Abstract 
  
 At the beginning of 2007, EdP, a Portuguese electricity utility was studying the 
potential acquisition of Horizon Wind Energy. Owned by Goldman Sachs, Horizon was 
a relevant player in the wind energy industry with capacity installed in USA. Requiring 
that EdP more than doubles its investments in renewables until 2010, this consolidation 
move would place the company as the 4th largest operator in the world.. Governmental 
support is just one of the factors that has to be analyzed in this deal, since the strategic 
implications and risks involved may determine the approval or refusal to go forward 
with the acquisition, and the price to be paid for the American company. 
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Acquisition of Horizon Wind Energy by EdP 
Introduction  
 It is after lunch in Lisbon and chaos is instilled on the streets around Marquês 
de Pombal. From the window of his office, António Mexia, the former minister of Public 
Works, Transport and Communication of Portugal watches the traffic jam while he is 
waiting for the arrival of the remaining executive members. The recently appointed 
CEO of EdP has requested a meeting to discuss the acquisition of Horizon Wind 
Energy, an important opportunity that was presented some weeks earlier by Goldman 
Sachs and had made António Mexia very interested in the operation. 
 After a while the executive team is finally together and the conditions for the 
meeting to begin are set. António Mexia complains about the typical Portuguese lack of 
punctuality, informing the other executives that he has to leave before 6.30pm, to pick 
up his daughter from school. The first speaker is António Martins da Costa, a 
knowledgeable executive, who starts by presenting the history of EdP. 
 
EdP – Energias de Portugal 
 EdP was created in 1976 as result of a wave of nationalizations that dominated 
Portugal in the period subsequent to the political revolution of 1974. The vertically- 
integrated electric utility resulted from the merger and nationalization of many smaller 
firms in the electricity sector, becoming instantly the dominant player in the Portuguese 
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electricity market, on the activities of generation, supply, distribution and 
commercialization. 
 After some decades of stable growth and diversification, political decisions were 
taken towards the reprivatisation of the company. The process started in 1997 (sale of a 
29.6% stake), progressing through new privatization phases (in May 1998, June 1998, 
October 2000, November 2004 and December 2005) until the company reached the 
current profile in which roughly 75% of the company’s capital is non-state owned. 
Nowadays the portfolio1 of operating units include generation, supply and distribution 
of electricity in Portugal and Spain, making it the third biggest operator in the Iberia 
with 12,452 MW of installed electricity generation capacity. The operations in Spain are 
made through HC Energia a formerly Spanish-owned utility called Hidroeléctrica del 
Cantábrico, with core operations in Asturias and Basque regions. In Iberia, EdP also has 
a very relevant position in the gas market. Outside Iberia, the company is present in the 
Brazilian electricity market. 
 The anticipation of renewable energy sources’ potential by the management had 
origin in 1993 – the year of Enernova’s foundation. The purpose of Enernova was to 
explore energy projects from renewable sources - especially wind - in Portugal. After a 
period of reflection and preparation, Enernova started operating in 1996 with an 
installed capacity of 10 MW in what was considered a very innovative project for the 
time. In addition to wind projects, Enernova initiated a project in biomass power in 
1999 with 9 MW of capacity. One year after the launch of Enernova, the Spanish 
predecessors of Genesa installed the first turbines with an aggregate capacity of 13 MW. 
In subsequent years, the installed capacity grew steadily but still represented only a tiny 
part of the total electricity production in the two countries of Iberia.  
                                                 
1 Exhibit 12 and Exhibit 13 
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 Eventually the renewable power turned out to be of greater significance to EdP, 
and the company started to look at it in a different light. The acquisition of 80% of 
Genesa in 2002 (Caja Madrid retained 20%) was the first sign that the future of wind 
power was much more evident on the Spanish side of the border than on the Portuguese 
one. Genesa was, in turn, the result of the merger of Hidrocantábrico subsidiaries for 
renewable: Genesa and Sinae. The installed capacity reached the dimension of 328 MW 
in 2003 and 530 MW in 2004, dominated by the generating facilities in Spain.  
 The confirmation of the importance of wind energy on the portfolio of EdP came 
with the acquisition of Desa (2005). Including the Spanish assets of Nuon, Desa had 
much of the implied capacity (1490 MW) still in the pipeline. However, the acquisition 
helped the portfolio dispersion across the Spanish country and the entry into France. In 
the same year, EdP creates the holding NEO Energia that became in charge for the 
management of all companies in the renewable energies business line.  
 The autonomous management brought a brand new vigour to the area and a 
series of acquisitions took place. Those operations expanded the leadership of Spain in 
terms of generating installed capacity on the company portfolio, relegating the share of 
Portugal to a subordinated position (~20% in 2007). The strategy of EdP for the 
renewable energies favoured growth through the development of early-stage/greenfield 
projects, rather than the acquisition of operating assets. This is justified by the superior 
capacity that EdP argues to have on the management of projects during the continuous 
phases of the pipeline.  
 In the presentation, António Martins da Costa deliberately emphasizes the 
investments in the renewable sector, as the purpose of the meeting concerns the 
potential acquisition of Horizon Wind Energy (“Horizon”), an American company 
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specialized in wind energy. He then proceeds by giving an overview of the energy 
industry. 
 
Industry Overview 
 Renewable energies are seen as the rising stars of the new energetic paradigm 
that countries are projecting for the future, especially the countries of OECD (Exhibit 
3). For them, issues related with energy prices climb, oil/gas external dependence and 
global warming became hot question marks, requiring action in the short-term. 
 On the supply side, the market is already changing mostly in response to benefits 
provided by governmental authorities. A solution for the aforementioned issues has not 
yet been found, since there are still several drawbacks preventing renewable and nuclear 
energies from assuming a more prominent position in the energy mix. For the former, 
the main concerns are high costs and intermittent production, whereas for the latter, the 
main problems are radioactive waste and bad memories of Chernobyl and Three Mile 
Island accidents. 
 By extrapolating the current trends, the power production in OECD is expected2 
to increase at 0.9% per annum, holding the current ranking of fuels in the energy mix. In 
particular, the production from nuclear sources, which is often presented as a solution 
for the current problems of CO2 emissions, has no perspectives of increase (thus, its 
weight is expected to decrease). Even though the lead from coal is unarguable, the 
growth of Gas (due to cost and environmental advantages over other fossil fuels) and 
renewable energies constitute the highlights deriving from IEA3 perspectives. 
Furthermore, renewable energies are expected to lead the investments in the industry. 
                                                 
2 World Energy Outlook 2007 
3 IEA – International Energy Agency  
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 Within the renewable energies industry, Wind is receiving the largest part of the 
investment. This can be partially explained by the higher development stage of Wind 
technology when compared with other renewables such as the Biomass and Solar, 
already being able to compete with Hydro. (Exhibit 4) 
 According to GWEC – the Global Wind Energy Council – the countries with 
largest wind power installed capacity in 2007 are Germany (22.3GW), USA (16.8GW), 
Spain (15.1GW), India (8GW) and China (6.1GW). By 2012, almost 95% of the new 
capacity is expected to be installed in Asia, North America and Europe. By the end of 
2012, Europe is expected to hold the lead (with 102 GW, which represents 42.4% of the 
world capacity), followed by Asia with 66 GW and North America with 61.3 GW. 
According to information collected by EdP, it is forecasted about 16.5 GW of new 
capacity in United States for the period 2007-2010, the largest growth potential in the 
world. 
 The senior executive’s speech comes to an end, and while he is thanked by 
António Mexia, Ana Maria Fernandes starts to prepare. Recently integrated in the 
managerial team of EdP, Ana Fernandes was chosen by the current CEO: the two had 
worked together some years earlier in Galp, and now she is in charge for renewable 
energies and gas operations of EdP. Even before presenting Horizon, and conscious of 
the current importance of governmental support to renewable energies, the executive 
launches her presentation by referring to the public initiatives that sustain much of the 
development of renewable energies. 
 
Kyoto Protocol 
 The adoption of Kyoto’s Protocol in 2007 symbolizes an important breaking 
point, when the world abandoned the fruitless rhetoric, and became committed to the 
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issues associated with global warming. Under the supervision of the United Nations, 
most industrialized countries agreed on binding goals for a reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, to the order of 5.2% (benchmark: year 1990) in 2012.  
 The Protocol is based on the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’, meaning that only the industrialized countries are attached to the 
reduction efforts. This is actually the reason why the USA refused to ratify the 
agreement. Kyoto also includes the so-called flexible mechanisms, being the most 
important the Emissions Trading (a.k.a. carbon market). 
 
European initiatives 
 The subject of renewable energy sources is of particular interest to Europeans, so 
it is no wonder that the European Union and its institutions are leading the movement in 
favour of a greener world. Although the idea could appear too naive, renewable sources 
are emerging as solid alternatives for a region that is becoming increasingly concerned 
with their energetic dependency. 
 The European Commission’s White Paper on renewable energy in 1997 
represented the launch, by encouraging the countries of EU to increase their share of 
renewable energies in the overall mix from 6% to 12% in 2010. However, as time went 
by, some signs gradually appeared that those targets were not in line to be achieved. 
This was particularly evident on the sectors of biofuels and heating/cooling. 
 Following some preparatory work, the Commission finally presented the 
Renewable Energy Road Map in 2007, where it proposes ambitious targets4 for energy, 
known as 20/20/20 goals to be accomplished by 2020. These mandatory goals5 include 
                                                 
4 These proposals were included on the Climate and Energy Package, voted and approved on the 
European Parliament at 17 December 2008.  
5 The targets were set for the EU as a whole, being each country attached to specific targets. 
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reducing greenhouse gases by 20%, as well as achieving a 20% share of renewable 
energies in the energy consumption. In addition, and only indicatively, the energy 
efficiency should also be improved by 20%.  
 The fact that 20% of the energy consumed in the EU must come from renewable 
sources together with the reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions, have 
promoted a great dynamism among the European companies, which therefore became 
the outstanding worldwide leaders on the renewables industry. 
 Even though the EU shares a common target, the way each country is supporting 
the renewable energy program is not exactly the same. The most used mechanism is 
Feed-in Tariffs, yet different schemes are also used. Under Feed-in tariffs, electric 
utilities are obliged to purchase all electricity produced by renewable sources at a fixed 
minimum price, above the regular market price for a given period, as an incentive to 
invest in the sector. Besides this, other mechanisms are being used (in some cases in 
addition to Feed-in tariffs) such as tax incentives, quota schemes or green certificate 
system (regular producers are obliged to buy green certificates from renewable energy 
producers, on a fixed percentage of their production). 
 
American initiatives 
 Despite the fact that the renewables subject is not as mature in the USA as it is in 
Europe, there is actually quite a developed industry exploring this market, mainly in 
Texas and California. Alternatively to the Kyoto Protocol that USA never ratified, the 
country has set other goals and found other ways to support green technologies, a topic 
that has been gaining momentum in the last years. The most important mechanisms 
regarding the support of renewable energies are PTC, MACRS and RPS. 
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 The PTC – Production Tax Credits – is a federal incentive in which a fixed 
premium is paid to the producers of renewable energy by each megawatt of energy 
produced, for a 10-year period subsequent to the capacity instalment. In 2007 the 
premium is of $19/MW, and according to the law it should increase in line with 
inflation. The PTC were established in 1992, yet they needed to be consequently 
renewed, since its lifetime is normally of three years. This is a serious issue for 
renewable producers, because the current PTC expires in 2008, without any guarantee 
that it will be extended, even if that is the common expectation. Without distressing the 
current capacity, the non-renewal of PTC would probably freeze much of the future 
capacity. 
 Another important incentive is MACRS, which stands for Modified Accelerated 
Cost Recovery System. Through this special accounting device, the renewable 
producers are able to depreciate much of their equipment over 5 years (instead of the 
regular 20 years). This system has been present in the American accounting standards 
since 1987, without expectations of ending. 
 Finally, the third factor that is boosting the industry is RPS – Renewable 
Portfolio Standards. These are held not at Federal but State level, imposing that a fixed 
share (normally 10-20% in 2015) of the energy produced by an electric utility, comes 
from renewable sources. These target shares vary across the states (Exhibit 5), in a 
system that is very similar to the one adopted by European Union. In practise, the way 
the electric utilities achieve those targets is through the negotiation of REC – 
Renewable Energy Certificates. These certificates assure that the energy produced came 
from renewable source, and are normally bought together with energy from renewable 
producers, although they can also be sold separately from producers that have them in 
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excess. Currently, Wind is the most competitive resource of RECs as Hydro projects are 
excluded by most states to fulfil RPS. 
 
 Having the governmental part completed, Ana Fernandes finally directs the 
attention of the audience to the ‘hot’ topic of the afternoon: Horizon Wind Energy. The 
company was Goldman Sachs property, and the investment bank was very active in the 
market searching for a buyer. At the same time, the commitment to renewable energies 
expressed in the recently approved strategic plan, was a strong sign that EdP could 
represent what Goldman was searching for.  
 The executive responsible for renewable and gas operations, begins by 
introducing Horizon, explaining EdP’s motives for the acquisition of the American 
company. 
 
History: Horizon Wind Energy LLC 
 The deep roots of Horizon come from a small company called International 
Wind, based in Dallas, Texas, which started to develop wind farms in the early 1990s. 
At that time, wind power was not yet in fashion, but the concerns related with the 
shortages of energy in 1970s and the incentives introduced for the renewable energies 
(PTC in 1992) were creating space for the commercial use of the wind energy. 
 The calendar was showing the year 1998 when the former owners of a very 
innovative gas and oil company, Selim and Michael Zilkha jumped in, with fresh money 
from the recent sale of Zilkha Energy Company and acquired International Wind. Father 
and son had achieved a high reputation by introducing sophisticated techniques that 
allowed the drilling of oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico that had already been closed due 
to their lack of competitiveness. The duo took overall control of the company in 2000 
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for about $6 million, renamed it Zilkha Renewable Energy and opened a new chapter 
for the company.  
 The management brought new and diversified blood to the company, including 
wind power specialists, traditional power plant developers, Peace Corps participants and 
other activists. The new owners also had a familiar way of running the company which 
particularly helped in the development stage of the company. By the words of Michael 
Zilkha: “Making a profit is essential for a business to remain vital and exciting, but it is 
also wonderful when a business has a purpose beyond simple economic motive… (like) 
avoid an ecological disaster”. 
 The company’s nature remained from the International Wind times, so the 
business was still “build-transfer”, which consists of the construction of wind-farms for 
further sale. 
 Under Zilkha’s ownership, the company “took-off” from a small office in Dallas 
to reach a prominent position within the biggest national wind-farms developers, with 
projects ranging from California in the west coast to New York on the opposite coast. 
As the business was growing, financial constraints, along with a family approach started 
to stifle further growth of the clean-tech company. According to company’s sources: 
“wind projects are getting bigger and bigger, and it is becoming a business whose 
capital requirements are significant even for very wealthy individuals” and continued 
“the projects and companies involved are becoming more attractive to players who can 
mobilize a lot of capital.” So it was about time to move forward, and the next character 
was Goldman Sachs. 
 Being one of the largest investment banks in the world, Goldman Sachs was 
aggressively investing in the renewable sector on technologies such as cellulosic 
ethanol, photovoltaic solar modules and wind turbines when Zilkha’s enterprise crossed 
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its path. In 2005, the year of Goldman’s acquisition of Zilkha, the company had 
interests in about 4,000 MW at different stages of development. The terms of the deal 
were never disclosed but the size of the deal was said to be far greater (around $1 
billion)6 than the figures involved in the acquisition of International Wind five years 
before. 
 Along with new-owner’s money came an evolution in the company’s nature. 
Beyond the developer function, the enterprise became a “developer-owner-operator” of 
wind-farms, which comprise holding and managing the energy complex rather than just 
constructing it for further sale. The company was also renamed Horizon Wind Energy 
LLC. In the following years with the financial support of Goldman, Horizon started an 
impressive expansion across the country, claiming a presence in 15 States and a pipeline 
of more than 9,000 MW (just 2 years after the acquisition). 
 
Strategic rationale of the concentration move: 
 The motivations behind the deal are centred on the following general ideas: (i) 
projection of EdP as a global leader in renewable energies; (ii) operation fully consistent 
with the Strategic Plan 2007-20107; (iii) entry into a market with high growth potential 
and finally, (iv) reduction of portfolio and regulatory risk through diversification. 
 If the operation is successful, EdP climbs directly to the 4th position in terms of 
global wind installed capacity (Exhibit 6). Such a significant operation in the renewable 
market still requires the approval of American authorities, but the procedure was not 
seen as a problem by the Portuguese utility.   
 As a global leader in wind energy the bargaining power is enhanced, with 
understandable reflections on the relationships with turbine suppliers. Moreover, 
                                                 
6 In The Sunday Times:http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/specials/rich_list/article5817180.ece 
7 Exhibit 8 
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Horizon has more than 9,000 MW at different stages of pipeline, which enables the 
company to carry on organic growth, profiting from being an early mover in the 
American market.  
 The company believes that many advantages could arise from the early mover 
position, essentially the privileged access to existing electricity grid and most 
favourable locations (in terms of wind quantity and consistency). The larger set of 
historic (wind) records constitutes an important competitive advantage when developing 
the greenfield of the company, and afterwards on selecting the best projects from the 
pipeline. The company expects that after the acquisition is completed, additional 
projects will enter in prospective phase (and afterwards in pipeline), delivering about 
800 MW to installed production per year beyond 2010. Besides the importance of the 
American market as one of the fastest growing markets in the world, EdP anticipates 
that Horizon can serve as a platform to enter in other North American markets. 
 The diversification of the portfolio is also seen as an important gain from the 
transaction. The maturity signs on the markets where EdP operates - namely Spain and 
Portugal on a smaller scale - were emerging, with companies installing new wind-farms 
with lower load factors. (Exhibit 1). Thus, in order to maintain the competitiveness of 
wind energy, new favourable locations were needed. Furthermore, by diversifying the 
production into the USA, the Portuguese utility would also reduce its regulatory risk. 
 
 Worried about the dimension of Horizon and the impact that it would have on 
the financials of EdP, the CFO Nuno Alves raises the important matter about valuation 
of the American company. The company has already had significant experience in the 
sector, but both the size of the operation and the lack of expertise in USA create new 
challenges for the management. The opinion of the CFO is that two additional factors 
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should be analyzed in the deal: the sustainability of the strong appreciation of the 
EURO against the US Dollar, and the impact that the operation could have on the 
credit rating of EdP. 
 It was about time to go deeper into the operation details, and Ana Fernandes 
restarts her exposition referring to the critical elements to be considered in the 
valuation. 
 
Investment Plan: 
1 - Capacity 
 Even though Horizon had a vast experience in developing wind-farms, the first 
results from its day-to-day management had only recently started to appear. The 
mainstream of projects to be owned were expected to leave the pipeline during 20078, 
being the intention of EdP to negotiate Institutional Equity Partnerships to compromise 
the capacity to be installed in 2007. 
 More than the installed capacity, the crucial element in this deal for EdP was the 
existing pipeline. The purchase of the existing pipeline allows important savings in 
prospective costs (already incurred by Horizon), as well as benefiting from premium 
spots to place wind-parks. According to EdP’s estimates, the superior class of Horizon’s 
assets could achieve a long-term expected load factor of 36%, an impressive figure 
when compared with EdP’s load factor in Portugal & Spain (28%), and France (25%). 
 According to the financial model used by EdP, the useful lifetime of a turbine is 
20 years, a belief that is shared by turbine suppliers. The model also assumes that there 
is still significant value after the 20 year useful life, to the order of 20% of the CAPEX. 
This value can come from repowering (replacement of old turbines) or salvage. By 
                                                 
8 Exhibits 10, 11 and 11a 
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repowering, the company saves in civil works, network connections and can even 
receive incentives (namely in Spain). In the case of salvage, production licenses, land 
leases, network connections or simple scrap still have some value in the market after the 
20 year lifetime. 
1 - Sales 
 The sales of Horizon comprise not only the energy, but also the Renewable 
Energy Certificates (REC) that are used to fulfil RPS requirements. Because those 
requirements vary across states, added to the fact that different states have different 
potentialities for renewable energy production, the prices of REC can differ quite a lot 
from state to state. 
 The forecasts made for the United States incentive the investment on the 
country, namely supported by the expected rise of energy prices in the long-run. 
(Exhibit 9). These forecasts assume that after 2008, energy prices may decline for a 
while, but fundamental drivers will later push energy prices up. As fundamental drivers 
for rising prices the company identifies the decline in reserve margins caused by 
increase in demand, the increasing capital costs of conventional generation technologies 
and the carbon trading poised to start in the country. 
 Horizon operates three different sales channels, being PPA (Power Purchase 
Agreement) the most important for the company. Under PPAs, Horizon and electricity 
utilities establish deals by which energy and REC are sold together at spot price 
(normally escalating with inflation). Moreover, these PPAs are set for periods of 10-20 
years. The remaining sales are done directly through the market, either hedged or at 
pool price, being the REC sold separately from the energy. 
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2 - Costs 
 Regarding expenditures, a practical approach is often done through the 
distinction between capital expenses (CAPEX) and operational expenses (OPEX). 
 The CAPEX is dominated by turbine costs9, which lately have been increasing 
due to rising pressure on steel prices. Even though this is not a problem for 2007 since 
all the contracts with suppliers are already closed, it represents a risk factor for the 
subsequent years. Nonetheless, according to EdP forecasts, CAPEX on current pipeline 
is expected to reach an average $1.8 MM per MW to be installed.  
 Concerning the operational side, the discrepancy in the performance of both 
companies is notorious. By comparing the efficiency ratios of Horizon and EdP, it is 
possible to verify that the Portuguese company expects to spend $48.000/MW in OPEX 
against $65.000/MW by Horizon in 2007. (Exhibit 16). The performance of EdP comes 
from the superior management of O&M10 and real-time centralized control of 
widespread wind-farms. The management of EdP considers that is able to transfer 
know-how and apply its reputable model to operations that it may acquired in USA, 
fulfilling the massive space that exists to improve Horizon’s performance.  
 The negotiations with Goldman Sachs also included two additional points. EdP 
redeems the debt of Horizon (assumed to be $0.18 billion) and reimburses the 
investment bank for the capital expenditures already incurred in 2007. Moreover, the 
company anticipates that the acquisition of Horizon would increase net debt in more 
than $4 billion US dollars by 2010. The impact of the acquisition is expected to 
gradually being reduced, driving financial ratios back to levels consistent with the low 
risk profile that characterizes EdP. Much of this debt comes from Institutional Equity 
                                                 
9 Exhibit 14 
10 O&M stands for ‘Operations and Maintenance’. The key advantage of EdP is its ability to internalize 
functions (such as inspections/revisions or stock management of spare parts) that peers normally 
outsource to turbine suppliers at higher costs. 
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Partnerships (which in accounting terms is registered as Other Liabilities), since the 
remaining funds from this project will be provided though shareholders’ loans (intra-
group loans). 
3 - Institutional Equity Partnership Structures 
 In order to gather the tax credits granted by the American authorities, Horizon 
had to find a clever system, since the current small turnover hinders that possibility for 
the company. The solution adopted was to set up agreements with institutional partners 
– normally global investment banks – that, in contrast with Horizon, have enough 
taxable income to take full advantage of the tax credits. (Exhibits 17 and 18) 
 To finance new capacity Horizon establishes partnerships, where institutional 
partners enter with a significant part of the investment, and are designed in such a way, 
that they receive an agreed IRR. The Flip Date is the time when agreed IRR is achieved, 
and after the Flip Date, institutional partners either keep a residual share of the wind-
farms, or sell it to Horizon. 
 Until the Flip Date the income related with taxation - namely PTC, tax reduction 
due to MACRS and payable taxes – is allocated to institutional partners as it is 
generated. To reach the agreed IRR, the operational income is also assigned to the 
partners, but only after Cash Flip Date (and until the Flip Date). The Cash Flip Date is 
reached when Horizon finishes the recovery (through the operational results) of capital 
that was used to fund the construction of the wind-farm. 
 Currently institutional partners are requesting an IRR of around 6% to enter in 
these partnerships, where they generally finance 50% of new wind-farms. Under these 
partnerships Horizon claims day-to-day control, even though some critical decisions 
(such as sale of major assets) require the partners’ approval. 
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Exhibit 1 – Wind Power  
Wind Energy Technology Presentation  
 
 Wind power is a form of energy conversion in which turbines convert the kinetic 
energy of wind into mechanical or electrical energy that can be used for power11. Being 
a renewable source, wind comes from the irregular way of the solar impact on the 
Earth’s surface. In areas of greater solar impact, air heats up and rises (creating low 
pressures) and it is this shift of air masses that forms the wind. 
 The device that converts wind’s kinetic energy in useful electricity is called 
wind turbine, which is mainly composed of a tower and a gondola comprising a rotor. 
The rotor combines blades (normally 3) and an axle, linked to each other by a gear box. 
Wind makes the blades spin, transmitting this energy to the gear box which is connected 
to a multiplier that increases the axle speed. Moreover, the multiplier is connected to a 
generator which is able to convert the mechanical energy into electricity. 
 The state-of-the-art turbines have blade diameter and tower height greater than 
100 metres, achieving 5MW of capacity. The wind turbines are grouped together 
(creating wind farms) in order to take maximum advantage of a windy spot, and reduce 
connection costs with the electric grid. Hilltops are normally the favourite places to 
raise wind farms due to favourable conditions of high altitudes.  
 Because wind does not blow equally everywhere, the location of wind-farms is a 
critical element in this industry. In technical terms, specialists use load factors to 
forecast energy output produced by a given technology. Load factor is a measure of the 
net energy output from a wind-farm as percentage of its total output capacity. Normally 
the computations are done for annual periods providing excellent forecasts for the 
output, since wind force does not vary much from one year to another. For example a 
5MW turbine with load factor of 30%, would produce approximately 13,140 
MWhours12 a year. 
 For wind energy, the standard load factors range from 25% to 40% which is a 
low figure when compared with other sources of energy13. Periods of weaker wind force 
or production stops (due to routine maintenance or unexpected reasons) push load 
factors down.  
                                                 
11 Encyclopedia Brittanica  
12 13,140 MWhours = 5 MW * 24 hours * 365 days * 0,3 
13 http://www.bwea.com/energy/rely.html 
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Exhibit 2 – Peers 
 
 FPL Energy (Gross Inst. Cap. 5,000 MW) – is a subsidiary of the 
American FPL Group Inc, one of the nation’s largest players on the electricity sector, present in 
27 States and Canada. Wind represents about 33% of FPL Energy portfolio, whereas 42% is 
Natural Gas, 16% is Nuclear and the remaining part is hydro, solar and oil sources. It is the 
largest owner and operator of wind generating facilities in the world, present in 15 States of 
USA, with most of the capacity concentrated in California and Texas. In addition, FPL is also 
the biggest generator of solar thermal power worldwide, with 310 MW of installed capacity. 
 
 IBERDROLA (Gross Inst. Cap. 4,800 MW) – is a world leading electric 
utility, with headquarters in Bilbao – Spain, operating in about 40 countries but predominantly 
in Spain. The renewable portfolio is composed primarily by Wind (~ 95%). Renewables have 
been increasing during the last years achieving 14% of the company earnings in 2006.  
 IBERDROLA has plans for a major expansion, especially in the USA (which is 
expected to become its largest market) and in UK (in a smaller scale) through acquisitions of 
local firms, with the clear objective of becoming the world leader in wind. To help on the 
expansion plan, IBERDROLA is planning an IPO of 20% of the capital of the subsidiary in 
charge for the renewable segment. 
 
 ACCIONA (Gross Inst. Cap. 4,200 MW) – is a Spanish conglomerate 
group with operations in Infrastructures, Real Estate, Energy, Water, Urban and Environmental 
Services, Logistic and Transport Services. It is the world largest developer and constructor of 
wind farms, but only the third in term of installed capacity. With many small owned-farms 
spread over the world, the core of wind power capacity is based in Spain (~ 70%)  
 
 ScottishPower/PPM (Gross Inst. Cap 2,300 MW) – as part of the M&A 
deal between Iberdrola and Scottish Power, the portfolio of PPM Energy (Scottish Power 
subsidiary) is expected to be integrated on Iberdrola portfolio during the year of 2007. PPM 
Energy is a significant player on the American market, with a vast portfolio of wind farms and 
being the third largest independent gas storage provider. The integration on Iberdrola will create 
the world number one in Wind generating installed capacity. 
 
 ENDESA (Gross Inst. Cap. 1,900 MW) – is a Spanish leading electric 
utility. It is living turbulent times with takeover bids and political intervention over those bids. 
Has significant presence in Spain, Italy, Portugal and France. The portfolio size of Wind 
generating facilities was about the same as the one of EDP at the end of 2006.  
 
 BABCOCK & BROWN (Gross Inst. Cap. 1,500 MW) – proclaimed as 
an international investment and specialised fund and asset management group, it has interests in 
North America, Australia, Europe and Asia. The company has been focused on four different 
industries – the real estate, infrastructure, operating leasing, corporate and structures finance – 
creating and managing investment vehicles specialised on those industries. The weight of Wind 
on the portfolio is very small (~ 3%), with particular focus in European countries and USA. 
 
 INVENERGY (Gross Inst. Cap. 1,200 MW) – is an American company 
specialised on the development and management of large-scale clean electricity generating 
facilities, predominantly from Wind and clean natural gas. The focus up until now has been in 
North America and Europe (UK and Poland). 
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Exhibit 3 – Total Electricity Generation (in the reference scenario) 
 
 Energy demand (Mtoe) Share (%)  
 2005 2030 2005 2030 Growth (% p.a.)   
Power generation 2 231 2 814 100 100 0.9 
Coal 917 1 097 41 39 0.7 
Oil 118 64 5 2 -2.4 
Gas 382 599 17 21 1.8 
Nuclear 611 616 27 22 0 
Hydro 109 130 5 5 0.7 
Biomass and waste 60 154 3 5 3.8 
Other Renewables 33 154 1 5 6.4 
 
From: World Energy Outlook  2007, by International Energy Agency 
 
 
Exhibit 4 – Total energy demand (in the reference scenario) 
 
  Electricity (TWh) Share (%)  
  2005 2030 2005 2030 Growth (% p.a.) 
Total Generation 10 391 14 597 100 100 1.4 
Coal 3 947 5 398 38 37 1.3 
Oil 538 295 5 2 -2.4 
Gas 1958 3 363 19 23 2.2 
Nuclear 2 348 2 364 23 16 0 
Hydro 1 270 1 510 12 10 0.7 
Biomass and waste 192 492 2 3 3.8 
Wind 102 959 1 7 9.4 
Geothermal 33 93 0 1 4.2 
Solar 3 112 0 1 16.3 
Tide and wave 1 11 0 0 12.9 
 
From: World Energy Outlook  2007, by International Energy Agency 
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Exhibit 5 – Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 
 
 
Exhibit 6 - Global wind ranking (installed capacity in Gross MW) by 2007: 
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Exhibit 7 - Wind generation capacity (expected) by 2010 in percentage (%): 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 8 - Main goals of EdP’s strategic plan 2007-2010: 
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Exhibit 9 – Recent and projected evolution of power prices in the US (USD/MWh) 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 10 – Pre-production phases 
 
 
 
Exhibit 11 – Wind generation capacity w/ current pipeline (Gross GW)    
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Exhibit 11a – Current Pipeline (Net GW) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 12 - EBITDA in 2006 (€ m) 
         
   2006 2005 ∆ 06/05 
Iberian Market      
       
  Generation & Supply  1070.8 1049 2.1% 
      Generation      
           Portugal  872.7 784.8 11.2% 
           Spain  338.9 523.9 -35.3% 
      Supply      
           Portugal  -71.3 -74.4   
           Spain  -69.3 -185.4   
       
  NEO - Renewable Energy  146.9 65.7 123.6% 
       
  Cogeneration  18.2 19.7 -7.6% 
       
  Distribution  571.8 458.6 24.7% 
      Portugal  529.8 429.4 23.4% 
      Spain  42.1 29.2 44.2% 
       
  Gas  144.8 123.4 17.3% 
      Portugal (Portgás - 100%) 33 30.1 9.6% 
      Spain  113.5 105.8 7.3% 
      Adjustments  -1.7 -12.5   
       
       
Brazil  433.9 412.3 5.2% 
       
    Distribution  360.9 341.2 5.8% 
    Generation  101.2 63.7 58.9% 
    Supply  1.3 17.8 -92.6% 
    Adjustments  -29.5 -10.3   
       
       
Other & Adjustments  -80.9 -81.1   
       
       
Consolidated   2305.5 2047.6 12.6% 
 
Net Installed Capacity at year end 
  GW Growth (GW) 
2007 1.3 1 
2008 1.9 0.6 
2009 2.6 0.7 
2010 3.1 0.5 
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Exhibit 13 – EBITDA breakdown by segment (in 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 14 – CAPEX main inputs  
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Exhibit 15 – Turbine suppliers of EdP + Horizon (year 2007) 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 16 – OPEX breakdown 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Case: Acquisition of Horizon Wind Energy by EdP 
 
 
26 
 
Exhibit 17 – Institutional equity partnership structure  
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 18 - Institutional equity partnership structure  
 
 Operational CF Taxable Inc. PTC + MACRS 
 
 Horizon Inst. Partners Horizon Inst. Partners Horizon Inst. Partners 
t (expected)             
0 - Cash Flip Date ………….. 
 
100% 0% ≤ 1% ≥ 99% ≤ 1% ≥ 99% 
Cash Flip Date - Flip Date … 
 
0% 100% ≤ 1% ≥ 99% ≤ 1% ≥ 99% 
Flip Date onwards ………….. 95% 5% 95% 5% 100% 0% 
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Exhibit 19 - Selected Financial Market Data 
  Tax rate: 39% 
Figure1   
   February 2007 
US Libor - Overnight 5.29% 
Moody's Corp Bond AAA 5.39% 
Moody's Corp Bond AA 5.73% 
Moody's Corp Bond A 5.91% 
 
Figure2 
  Dez 2006 (US Dollars million) 
 
Market Capitalization 14,013.9 
Preferred Shares 0 
Total Debt 10,090.008 
 total 24,103.908 
D/E 0.72 
Equity 58.14% 
Debt 41.86% 
 
Figure3 
US Treasury Yield Rates (%) 
1 mo 3 mo 6 mo 1 yr 2 yr 3 yr 5 yr 7 yr 10 yr 30 yr
4.99 5.13 5.16 5.09 4.96 4.88 4.84 4.84 4.84 4.93 
 
Figure4 
Company Beta Asset 
    
EdP 0.511 
   
EDF 0.690 
   
Endesa 0.469 
   
Enel 0.343 
   
Iberdrola 0.645 
   
Union Fenosa 0.355 
   
Acciona 0.317 
   
FPL Group Inc 0.578 
   
Exelon Corp. 0.764 
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Exhibit 20 – Annual revenues (in US Dollars) 
 
Year Operational Revenues Total PTC 
2007 128.666.880 47.934.720 
2008 269.490.888 98.266.176 
2009 401.248.493 141.641.480 
2010 529.780.857 183.897.855 
2011 592.562.522 205.029.977 
2012 607.376.585 210.155.727 
2013 622.560.999 215.325.323 
2014 638.125.024 220.624.572 
2015 654.078.150 226.032.394 
2016 670.430.104 231.551.504 
2017 687.190.856 137.473.881 
2018 704.370.628 94.341.760 
2019 721.979.893 40.291.793 
2020 740.029.391 0 
2021 758.530.126 0 
2022 777.493.379 0 
2023 796.930.713 0 
2024 816.853.981 0 
2025 837.275.330 0 
2026 858.207.214 0 
2027 537.054.439 0 
2028 369.642.709 0 
2029 154.522.074 0 
Case-writer forecasts for installed capacity and current pipeline. 
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Teaching Note 
Synopsis 
 At the beginning of 2007, EdP, a Portuguese electricity utility was studying the 
potential acquisition of Horizon Wind Energy (“Horizon”). Owned by Goldman Sachs, 
Horizon was a relevant player in the wind energy industry with capacity installed in 
USA. Requiring that EdP more than doubles its investments in renewables until 2010, 
this consolidation move would place the company as the 4th largest operator in the 
world.  
 Being part of the broad energy industry, wind technology gains momentum as 
countries try to evolve from the coal-oil paradigm on electricity generation. Enhancing 
renewable energies is the governmental support that is being provided under different 
instruments. Governmental support is just one of the factors that has to be analyzed in 
this deal, since the strategic implications and risks involved may determine the approval 
or refusal to go forward with the acquisition, and the price to be paid for the American 
company. 
 
Teaching objectives and target audience  
 Directed to finance students, this business case can be worked under two 
perspectives: corporate strategy of M&A operations and project valuation.  For this 
reason, the case is recommended for Corporate Finance and Mergers, Acquisition and 
Restructuring courses. In the light of corporate strategy, students have the opportunity 
to discuss the motivations to undertake M&A operations, as well as the risks that may 
be involved on operations of this nature. On the analytical field, the case is structured to 
be either used in introductory courses (e.g. ignoring the complexity of the financing 
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structure, and assume a simple WACC), or in intermediate courses (exploring the full 
complexity of the financing process). In addition, having renewable energies as an 
underlying subject, the business case can also be the starting point for a discussion 
about this fashionable topic. 
 
Proposed Questions 
 The following questions have the purpose of helping teachers to explore the 
potentialities of the business case. The first two questions concern strategic assessment 
of the operation. The following two questions regard project valuation. Finally, the last 
questions can introduce the discussion about renewable energies and the way that are 
being backed by governments. 
 
1- Imagine that you are a board member of EdP present in the meeting. If 
António Mexia asks for your opinion about the rationale of the operation, 
what would you have to say? 
2- What are the main risks that should concern EdP on this deal? 
3- What is the maximum amount that EdP should be willing to offer for 
Horizon’s equity in US dollars? 
4- How does that amount changes, if federal authorities discontinue their 
support to renewable energies? 
5- What are the main advantages and disadvantages of wind energy, when 
compared with other energy resources? 
6- How are renewable energies, particularly wind, being supported in the 
USA? 
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 Strategic assessment 
 
1- How do you analyze the strategic rationale that is presented to defend the 
acquisition of Horizon? 
Possible answer: 
 The reasons presented by the administration of EdP to go forward with the deal 
should be carefully analyzed, as some of the arguments used may be misleading. 
 Starting with the argument of consistency with Business Plan 2007-2010, we 
consider that, by principle, it should not represent a motive to do the deal. In our 
opinion, business plans represent only guidelines for managers, and the rule should be 
value creation for the shareholders, as circumstances may change or new opportunities 
appear. Even in terms of consistency, it is hardly acceptable to state that Horizon “fully” 
fits the Business Plan: many of the states where Horizon operates are deregulated 
markets for electricity and renewable energies are not the core business of EdP. 
Moreover, the impact that the operation will have on the debt of the company – more 
than $4 billion dollars by 2010 – is significantly high for the current levels of debt 
(around €10 billion or $13 billion US Dollars). Thus, at least in the short/medium term, 
the financial ratios will be penalized, against the expressed instructions present in the 
Business Plan that claim “Strength of all financial ratios in the period”. 
 The projection of EdP as industry leader can bring striking benefits, but the 
management should keep in mind that more important than size, is the efficiency of the 
company (meaning that EdP should avoid growth at any price). After making this 
remark, and assuming that EdP grows conscientiously, the benefits from industry 
leadership are vast, but two of them deserve our attention: economies of scale and 
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bargaining power. As it is said in the case study, EdP internalizes much of its 
operational expenses (unlike most competitors that outsource that function to turbine 
makers), and make it sense to assume that as the operations of the company enlarge, the 
company improves its ability in this field. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that 
operational expenses per megawatt decrease (for example by taking better advantage of 
spare parts, or from the real-time monitoring central), as installed capacity increases. 
 Larger size can also bring gains in terms of bargaining power, in particular with 
turbine suppliers. As Exhibit 15 shows, turbines supply will be very much concentrated 
in 2 operators (Vestas and Gamesa), and higher bargaining power of EdP would work 
not only as a counterweight with those suppliers power, but with all the suppliers of the 
company, creating downward pressure on their margins. Taking into consideration that 
turbine costs dominate the CAPEX, and in line, that CAPEX is a major expense in this 
business, the gains from higher bargaining power can be of great importance.  
 Regarding the diversification effect, administration claims that the operation 
would reduce portfolio and regulatory risk. Although this is true for EdP, some authors1 
argue that it should be investors and not companies to diversify, since there is evidence 
that corporate diversification may destroy value. This can actually be confirmed in the 
market, when we see groups trading at a lower price than their Net Asset Value (for 
example Sonae SGPS2 during 2000 and 2001). Nonetheless, in this case we believe that 
investors are better off if it is the company that diversifies: either due to reasons related 
with market leadership (already presented) or due to financing costs. Because the 
pipeline of Horizon is very large, only a solid company – such as EdP – has the capacity 
to keep the investment plan, committing themselves to the investments projected. The 
                                                 
1 E.g. Lang and Stulz (1994) 
2 From: Manuel Noronha Andrade, “Diversification, Control and Value Creation: the Case of Sonae 
SGPS”, University of London (2003) 
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size of the operator and its commitment to the project are important factors when 
dealing with institutional investors, as the returns negotiated for equity partnerships can 
be a significant cost in the project. 
 Assuming that it should be EdP to diversify, there is no doubt that gains from 
diversification are significant, essentially at regulation level. Being an emergent 
technology, wind still relies on the support of governmental authorities to be profitable 
enough to attract private investors (in Portugal and Spain through feed-in tariffs, and in 
the United States by tax credits). If, for any unexpected reason, regulation suddenly 
changes in one country (e.g. if in Portugal, the feed-in tariff decreases), the business 
model of EdP for renewables could be seriously damaged, since much of the production 
is concentrated in Portugal and Spain. Besides regulatory risk, by spreading out 
production to other countries, EdP also becomes less dependent on the atmospheric 
conditions in the Iberia Peninsula.  
 The highest growth potential of the American market is also a supportive motive 
presented by EdP to buy Horizon. Even though a fast growing market can represent a 
good opportunity, the return that the company is able to get from that market (in this 
case, the return that is provided by the established regulation) is also an important part 
of the equation. Therefore, it is the relation potential/return that should be analyzed to 
select the best markets as expansion targets. 
 Finally, the company claims that it expects to profit from being an early mover 
in the American market (through Horizon) by having privileged access to the existing 
electricity grid and to the most favourable locations (higher load factors). Again in this 
case, not only the quality of wind-farm locations should be taken into account, but also 
the price at which Horizon is able to get those locations is indeed an important element 
to be analyzed. 
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2- What are the main risks that should concern EdP on this deal? 
Possible answer: 
 In our opinion, the three most important sources of risk in this deal are 
governmental support, evolution of capital expenditures and exchange rates, not 
necessarily in this order. Moreover, the impact of the operation on the company credit 
rating is also a risk that EdP should take into account, since a deterioration of the rating 
means that the cost of debt will increase.  
 As we computed in question 4, without federal support, Horizon loses a 
significant part of its value, and the loss would be even bigger if RPS are abandoned. 
This is explained by the significant weight that governmental support still has in making 
renewable sources competitive with other energy sources. In particular, the non-renewal 
of PTC for the period after 2008 would be a serious drawback for the capacity that 
Horizon expects to install after 2008 (since as it is said in the case, the installed capacity 
would not be affected). Even considering that renewable energies are gaining 
momentum (as Exhibits  3 and 4 shows), there is always the possibility that the 
American administration gives up on supporting renewables and decide to invest, for 
example, in new forms of energy efficiency or even in nuclear power.  
 Furthermore, even if  government continues to support renewable energies, there 
is a chance that electricity utilities start to collect RECs – Renewable Energy 
Certificates – from renewable energies others than wind. In order for that to happen, 
however, the development stage of those renewables has to increase. Nonetheless, as 
soon as Horizon signs the PPAs (Power Purchase Agreement), it is, in principle, 
protected against REC price volatility or even electricity price changes (since under 
PPAs the electricity utilities are attached to a compromise of buying REC and power at 
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a price that is established at the beginning of the PPA). However, there is also the 
likelihood that spot electricity prices evolves in such a different way from forecasts (e.g. 
lower than expected) that those utilities will be unable to meet their commitments with 
renewable producers (e.g. resulting in bankruptcy). In this remote case, the revenues 
structure of Horizon would change, with unpredictable consequences for the company. 
 The evolution of capital expenditures (CAPEX) also constitutes a source of risk 
for this deal. As Exhibit 14 shows, turbines represent between 70 and 80% of CAPEX, 
and turbines are made of steel. The price of raw materials in the international markets 
has been increasing, and steel was not an exception. If the upward pressure on steel 
prices goes on, the business model of wind-farms could be significantly damaged, since 
CAPEX is of major importance in this industry. 
 Also linked to CAPEX, is the point of turbine suppliers. As it is shown in 
Exhibit 15, if EdP actually moves forward with the acquisition of Horizon, the 
dependence on two suppliers (which together will represent about 80% of the supply to 
EdP) can be critical. Moreover, this point is even more critical knowing that a big 
growth is expected for the USA. Thus, the demand for turbines will be very high and 
respectively, the bargaining power of those suppliers. 
 Finally, exchange rates should also be a concern in this deal. Because EdP is a 
Portuguese company that consolidates in Euros, and Horizon operates in US Dollars, 
the volatility of exchange rates could drastically change the value that the operations of 
Horizon, have for EdP. In this case, EdP has two main ways to mitigate exchange rates 
risk. The first option would be to match costs and revenues in the same currency: for 
example by raising the debt in US Dollars to cover CAPEX. The other option would be 
using financial instruments to hedge exchange rate through forward rates. These 
financial instruments allow for companies to transfer risk to counterparties, which are 
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willing to buy it. However, in accounting terms the use of those instruments is not 
straightforward, and so, exchange rate could remain as a risk source. 
 
 Analytical assessment 
 
3- What is the maximum amount that EdP should be willing to offer for 
Horizon’s equity in US dollars? 
Possible answer: 
 In order to arrive to a value for Horizon, the equity discounted cash flow model 
(aka Flow to Equity model) was used. The reason for the use of this model comes from 
the complexity of the financing structure of this project (since the capital structure of the 
project is constantly changing according to the characteristics of the Institutional Equity 
Partnerships), which make computations with WACC or APT very hard. Therefore, the 
solution was to compute levered cash flows (accounting from the flows of operational 
results and tax payments/benefits), and discount them at cost of equity. 
 During the computations several assumptions were undertaken. The most 
important was, probably, assuming that the value that EdP offers for Horizon, should 
include only the installed capacity and the current pipeline. Therefore, future projected 
capacity was ignored in the computations, since it was considered that EdP was able to 
create their own pipeline in USA without the acquisition of Horizon. In terms of 
installed capacity, the data from exhibit 11a was used, with a small remark. Because 
that data is referred to the capacity at the year end, for the years in which new capacity 
was installed (from 2007 to 2010), only half of the new capacity was considered for 
OPEX and revenue purposes. 
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 The OPEX was computed as the product of installed capacity and the price per 
MW (started at $48,000 and evolved with inflation – 2.5%) (Exhibit B). The reference 
price for OPEX came from EdP operations, rather than Horizon’s. The reason for that 
choice is justified by the fact that most of Horizon’s capacity for the following years is 
still to come, and having the chance to decide its future operational model, it makes to 
sense to assume that it will adopt EdP’s model: internalize much of the O&M 
(operations and maintenance) functions, since this model has been bringing good results 
to EdP. 
 Regarding CAPEX, forecasts for new capacity cost prepared by EdP were used. 
According to those forecasts, the installation of new wind farms will cost $1.8 million 
dollars per Megawatt. (Exhibit A) 
 Besides operational and capital expenses, the remaining significant cost was 
related with the financing process. The way Horizon used to finance new production is 
through Institutional Equity Partnerships (IEP), and in this valuation, it was assumed 
that this model will continue (since it is the option which guarantees that EdP are 
granted total access to tax credits provided by the American authorities). According to 
the information provided in the case, these institutional partners finance 50% of CAPEX 
in exchange for a return of 6%. In order to simply the computations, it was assumed that 
a single IEP was established, and only for the capacity that will start operating in 2008 
until 2010. (Exhibit C) 
 The mechanism of these partnerships can be briefly explained as follow: after 
launching a new wind-farm (that was 50% financed by the institutional partners), EdP 
gets the operational results generated by the facilities until it reaches the total recover of 
capital (the remaining 50% of CAPEX) – in this case,  this  will happen in year 2012. 
After that, the yearly operational results go to the Inst. Investors until they reach a 
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required IRR on its investment – here, will be around 2013. The amount that EdP has to 
pay to those investors is 50% of CAPEX, accruing annual interests at the rate of 6% 
with additional features concerning taxation. Since the launch of new partnership, Inst. 
Investors are in charge to pay the taxes that arise from operations, but at the same time, 
receive the Production Tax Credits (PTC) and MACRS (it was computed as the fiscal 
gain of being allow to depreciate assets in 5 years rather than 20) as they are generated. 
In conclusion, the liability to Institutional Investors accrues interest, but is reduced by 
the tax credits that they receive before they get the operational profits. Because these 
investors get totally paid after 7 years before the forecasted 10 years, after 2013 the PTC 
go directly to EdP. Moreover, it was assumed that after those partners get refunded, they 
keep a stake of 3% in the company. This corresponds to the proportional 5% of the TEI 
in the total capacity of the company. 
 Regarding cost of capital, the cost of equity was used as required by the Flow-to-
Equity model to discount the levered cash-flow. Therefore, to the regular free cash-
flow, it was added/subtracted the cash flows to the Institutional Equity Partners. This 
makes sense because, besides funds from institutional partners, the company decided to 
finance the project through shareholders’ loans. Thus, the discount rate used had to be 
the rate required by shareholders (cost of equity). In order to get the cost of equity the 
CAPM model was performed. The risk-free rate used was the 30-year US Treasury 
Yield Rate. For the expected market return, the best predictions that we can have are 
past returns. Following that idea it was decided to use the arithmetic average of the 
annual return of MSCI USA Index3 since 1996 as expected market return. The 
advantage of this index is that it includes a wide range of American companies. The 
final piece to perform CAPM was beta. Since unlevered beta of many EdP’s peers was 
                                                 
3 In Net terms (in order to include dividends in the return), and expressed in US Dollars. 
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available, the option was to average them to get a “proxy” for the industry unlevered 
beta. After adjusting this beta to EdP’s capital structure, we get the leveraged beta, 
necessarily to CAPM. Bringing together all these parts, the overall result for cost of 
equity is 8.88%. (Exhibit H). 
 Depreciation was also an important factor on the valuation. As said before, tax 
benefits from MACRS (accelerated depreciation) go to the equity partners. Thus, the 
depreciation rate used by EdP in the project should be 5% (the regular rate without 
benefits).(Exhibits D, E, F, G). To quantify the reward from MACRS, we computed the 
difference between depreciate the capacity (involved in the Partnership) in 5 and 20 
years, and then multiplied by the tax rate to get the fiscal gain from MACRS. (Exhibit 
G).  
 The overall result from the computations indicates that Horizon’s equity is worth 
$2,421,812,977 US Dollars. (Exhibit I) 
 
4- How does that amount changes, if federal authorities discontinue their 
support to renewable energies? 
Possible answer: 
 If federal authorities stop supporting renewable energies, both MACRS and PTC 
will be discontinued. Because RPS – Renewable Portfolio Standards – are managed at 
state level, it was assumed that they will be maintained. Without tax credits, EdP no 
longer needs to have institutional partners involved in the projects, having the 
possibility to raise debt at cheaper prices. For that reason, it was assumed that those 
equity partners were substituted by ordinary debt under the current capital structure of 
EdP (Debt/Equity = 0.72). It was also assumed a debt rate of 5.91% which was the yield 
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trading in the market for corporate bonds with rating of A (the grade of EdP at that 
time).  
 Having all the computations completed, we concluded that without federal 
support, Horizon’s equity only worth $1.246 billion (Exhibit J). This means that without 
the federal support, the project loses about half of its value. 
 
 Renewable Energies 
 
5- What are the main advantages and disadvantages of wind energy, when 
compared with other energy resources? 
Possible answer: 
 According to the figures present in the world energy outlook 2007 from OECD, 
wind energy is leading the renewable panel. Among other reasons, the driver that seems 
to differentiate Wind from other renewable resources is the economic competitiveness 
that it already achieves, when the environmental conditions are reasonable favourable. 
(see picture below). Knowing that the main challenge for renewable energies nowadays 
is their cost competitiveness, that is probably the reason for wind leadership. 
 On the website of EdP, the company enumerates a bunch of advantages of wind 
technology. Many of the reasons presented by EdP and environmental organizations are 
highly biased, supported many times on doubtful or super-optimistic assumptions. For 
this reason, only the most significant and less disputable factors will be referred. 
 Starting with the advantages, wind is an inexhaustibility resource that produces 
no greenhouse gas emissions while operating. Wind energy allows countries to reduce 
their foreign dependence, as well as the reliance on fossil fuels, as long as they possess 
favourable conditions. Because wind farms are normally installed in remote areas, it can 
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bring value for useless lands, but at the same time, does not obstruct that activities such 
as agriculture or livestock, being developed around turbines. 
 On the disadvantages’ side, the main issue is intermittency of production, 
meaning that complementary resources are needed to match electricity supply and 
demand. In this point, producers argue that although irregular, annual amounts of wind 
are quite stable. Nonetheless, complementary resources are still needed to match day-to-
day mismatches. Because wind farms are often installed in remote and dispersed areas, 
costs to adapt the electricity grid are seen as a minus for Wind. Although disputable, 
visual impact of turbines is being increasingly talked. The noise that it producers, can 
also be claimed as disadvantage. 
 
      In: World Energy Outlook 2006, IEA 
 
 
6- How are renewable energies, particularly Wind, being supported in the 
USA? 
Possible answer: 
 It is logical to separate the support that is being provided to wind energy at two 
levels: federal and state level.  
 At state level, the most relevant instrument is RPS (Renewable Portfolio 
Standards). RPS require that within 2015 and 2020 (varies from state to state) a fix 
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percentage (10%~20%) of the energy provided by electric utilities, come from 
renewable sources. More ambitious states such as California or New York anticipated 
their targets for 2010/2013. In many cases, there will be penalties for companies that fail 
the targets. The first state to include a RPS in the legislation was Texas in 1999, and the 
amount increased to 27 states by 2007. This solution is very market-oriented, since 
utilities can choose the cheaper energy (currently is Wind) to fulfil their standards. 
 Unlike RPS that were only established in some states (with different 
requirements), wind energy is also being supported through federal instruments that are 
equally applied in all the country. The most significant ones, according to the case, are 
MACRS and PTC. Starting by MACRS, which is an acronymic that stands for Modified 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System, it allows companies to apply depreciation rates of 
20%. This is very important for wind power producers, because much of the costs are 
initial costs, mostly turbines. Another important instrument is PTC – production tax 
credits – which applies to the first 10 years of production of new turbines. For the year 
2007, the tax credit is of $19 /MW produced, increasing in line with inflation. Being an 
important support to the investments in the wind industry, PTC represent also a risk 
source for companies since they need to be renewal every 3 years. In the past, it already 
happened that in two occasions, PTC were not renewed in time and retroactive laws 
were required to re-establish them. The consequences of this are well expressed in this 
quote from AWEA4: “When the PTC has lapsed in the past, wind energy investments 
have fallen 73-93% in the following years”.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 AWEA stands for American Wind Energy Association. 
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Exhibits 
 
Exhibit A – in US Dollars 
CAPEX year CAPEX TEI Contri (50%) 
CAPEX / MW 2007 1.080.000.000 540.000.000 
1.800.000 2008 1.260.000.000 630.000.000 
 2009 900.000.000 450.000.000 
 
 
 
Exhibit B – in US Dollars 
OPEX year capacity Nominal Cost opex w/ inflation 
OPEX / MW 2007 0,8 38.400.000 38.400.000 
48.000 2008 1,6 76.800.000 78.720.000 
 2009 2,25 108.000.000 113.467.500 
 2010 2,85 136.800.000 147.318.638 
 2011 3,1 148.800.000 164.247.358 
 2012 3,1 148.800.000 168.353.542 
 2013 3,1 148.800.000 172.562.381 
 2014 3,1 148.800.000 176.876.440 
 2015 3,1 148.800.000 181.298.351 
 2016 3,1 148.800.000 185.830.810 
 2017 3,1 148.800.000 190.476.580 
 2018 3,1 148.800.000 195.238.495 
 2019 3,1 148.800.000 200.119.457 
 2020 3,1 148.800.000 205.122.443 
 2021 3,1 148.800.000 210.250.505 
 2022 3,1 148.800.000 215.506.767 
 2023 3,1 148.800.000 220.894.436 
 2024 3,1 148.800.000 226.416.797 
 2025 3,1 148.800.000 232.077.217 
 2026 3,1 148.800.000 237.879.148 
 2027 1,8 86.400.000 141.576.460 
 2028 1,2 57.600.000 96.743.915 
 2029 0,5 24.000.000 41.317.714 
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Exhibit C – in US Dollars 
P&L Institutional Equity Partners 
Year EBiT Capital to 
Recover 
PTC MACRS Tax paid TEI Liab to TEI
Cash OutFlow Cash InFlow 
2007 73.341.840 466.658.160 47.934.720 0 13.781.414 13.781.414   505.846.694 
2008 190.770.888 905.887.272 98.266.176 63.180.000 28.032.937 28.032.937  1.032.784.258 
2009 287.780.993 1.068.106.279 141.641.480 136.890.000 47.796.777 47.796.777  1.314.016.610 
2010 382.462.220 685.644.059 183.897.855 189.540.000 83.775.644 83.775.644  1.103.195.395 
2011 428.315.164 257.328.896 205.029.977 189.540.000 101.199.762 101.199.762  876.016.904 
2012 439.023.043 -181.694.147 210.155.727 189.540.000 105.268.756 105.268.756 181.694.147 452.456.800 
2013 449.998.619 -631.692.766 215.325.323 105.300.000 109.439.475 109.439.475 268.418.361 0 
2014 461.248.584 -1.092.941.350 220.624.572   220.624.572    
2015 472.779.799 -1.565.721.149 226.032.394   226.032.394    
2016 484.599.294 -2.050.320.443 231.551.504   231.551.504    
2017 496.714.276 -2.547.034.719 137.473.881   137.473.881    
2018 509.132.133 -3.056.166.852 94.341.760   94.341.760    
2019 521.860.436 -3.578.027.288 40.291.793   40.291.793    
2020 534.906.947 -4.112.934.235        
2021 548.279.621 -4.661.213.856        
2022 561.986.611 -5.223.200.468        
2023 576.036.277 -5.799.236.745        
2024 590.437.184 -6.389.673.928        
2025 605.198.113 -6.994.872.042        
2026 620.328.066 -7.615.200.108        
2027 395.477.978 -8.010.678.086        
2028 272.898.794 -8.283.576.880        
2029 113.204.360 -8.396.781.241             
 
Exhibit D – in US Dollars 
  Depreciation Rate 
year Capex 1/5 1/20 
>2007 1.800.000.000 360.000.000 90.000.000 
2007 1.080.000.000 216.000.000 54.000.000 
2008 1.260.000.000 252.000.000 63.000.000 
2009 900.000.000 180.000.000 45.000.000 
 
Exhibit E – in US Dollars 
 Depreciation with MACRS (5-year) 
YEAR I II III IV TOTAL Inst Equit Part 
2007 360.000.000       360.000.000 0 
2008 360.000.000 216.000.000   576.000.000 216.000.000 
2009 360.000.000 216.000.000 252.000.000  828.000.000 468.000.000 
2010 360.000.000 216.000.000 252.000.000 180.000.000 1.008.000.000 648.000.000 
2011 360.000.000 216.000.000 252.000.000 180.000.000 1.008.000.000 648.000.000 
2012   216.000.000 252.000.000 180.000.000 648.000.000 648.000.000 
2013    252.000.000 180.000.000 432.000.000 432.000.000 
2014     180.000.000 180.000.000 180.000.000 
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Exhibit F – in US Dollars 
 Regular Depreciation (20-year) 
YEAR I II III IV TOTAL Inst Equit Part 
2007 90.000.000       90.000.000 0 
2008 90.000.000 54.000.000   144.000.000 54.000.000 
2009 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000  207.000.000 117.000.000 
2010 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000 162.000.000 
2011 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000 162.000.000 
2012 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000 162.000.000 
2013 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000 162.000.000 
2014 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000 162.000.000 
2015 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2016 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2017 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2018 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2019 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2020 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2021 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2022 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2023 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2024 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2025 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2026 90.000.000 54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 252.000.000   
2027   54.000.000 63.000.000 45.000.000 162.000.000   
2028    63.000.000 45.000.000 108.000.000   
2029       45.000.000 45.000.000   
 
Exhibit G – in US Dollars 
 Gain on MACRS for IEP 
Year Diffe (20% - 5%) Fiscal Gain 
2007 0 0 
2008 162.000.000 63.180.000 
2009 351.000.000 136.890.000 
2010 486.000.000 189.540.000 
2011 486.000.000 189.540.000 
2012 486.000.000 189.540.000 
2013 270.000.000 105.300.000 
2014 18.000.000 7.020.000 
 
Exhibit H 
 USA    
Mkt return 10,80%  D/(D+E) 41,86%
Risk-Free 4,93%    
Mkt premium 5,87%  E/(D+E) 58,14%
     
Rs 0,093137  Beta equity 0,7468
   Beta unlevered 0,5189
Rd 0,0591    
     
WACC 0,069241    
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Exhibit I 
US dollars 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014   (..)  2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 
                 
Revenues 128.666.880 269.490.888 401.248.493 529.780.857 592.562.522 607.376.585 622.560.999 638.125.024  837.275.330 858.207.214 537.054.439 369.642.709 154.522.074  
                 
OPEX 38.400.000 78.720.000 113.467.500 147.318.638 164.247.358 168.353.542 172.562.381 176.876.440  232.077.217 237.879.148 141.576.460 96.743.915 41.317.714  
                 
EBiTA 90.266.880 190.770.888 287.780.993 382.462.220 428.315.164 439.023.043 449.998.619 461.248.584  605.198.113 620.328.066 395.477.978 272.898.794 113.204.360  
                 
D&A 90.000.000 144.000.000 207.000.000 252.000.000 252.000.000 252.000.000 252.000.000 252.000.000  252.000.000 252.000.000 162.000.000 108.000.000 45.000.000  
                 
EBiT = EBT 266.880 46.770.888 80.780.993 130.462.220 176.315.164 187.023.043 197.998.619 209.248.584  353.198.113 368.328.066 233.477.978 164.898.794 68.204.360  
                 
Income 
Taxes @38% 
101.414 17.772.937 30.696.777 49.575.644 66.999.762 71.068.756 75.239.475 79.514.462  134.215.283 139.964.665 88.721.632 62.661.542 25.917.657  
                 
Net Income 165.466 28.997.951 50.084.216 80.886.576 109.315.401 115.954.286 122.759.144 129.734.122  218.982.830 228.363.401 144.756.346 102.237.253 42.286.703  
                 
D&A 90.000.000 144.000.000 207.000.000 252.000.000 252.000.000 252.000.000 252.000.000 252.000.000  252.000.000 252.000.000 162.000.000 108.000.000 45.000.000  
                 
CAPEX 540.000.000 630.000.000 450.000.000 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  
                 
TEI - $ IN 13.781.414 28.032.937 47.796.777 83.775.644 101.199.762 105.268.756 109.439.475 220.624.572  0 0 0 0 0  
TEI - $ OUT      181.694.147 268.418.361         
                 
terminal 
value 
           468.000.000 216.000.000 252.000.000 180.000.000 
                 
FCF -436.053.120 -428.969.112 -145.119.007 416.662.220 462.515.164 291.528.896 215.780.258 602.358.694  470.982.830 480.363.401 774.756.346 426.237.253 339.286.703 180.000.000 
                 
  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97%  97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 
FCF to EdP -436.053.120 -428.969.112 -145.119.007 416.662.220 462.515.164 291.528.896 215.780.258 584.287.933  456.853.345 465.952.499 751.513.656 413.450.135 329.108.102 174.600.000 
                 
DF @7,5% 1 0,914798242 0,836855824 0,765554237 0,700327671 0,640658522 0,58607329 0,536138816  0,201305568 0,18415398 0,168463737 0,154110331 0,14097986 0,128968128 
                 
Disc CF -436.053.120 -392.420.190 -121.443.686 318.977.528 323.912.167 186.770.471 126.463.046 306.800.483  90.070.893 84.037.791 123.992.432 62.403.186 45.440.962 22.053.550 
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Exhibit H 
US dollars 2007 2008 2009 2010  (…)  2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 
                     
Revenues 128.666.880 269.490.888 401.248.493 529.780.857  858.207.214 537.054.439 369.642.709 154.522.074   
              
OPEX 38.400.000 78.720.000 113.467.500 147.318.638  237.879.148 141.576.460 96.743.915 41.317.714   
              
EBiTA 90.266.880 190.770.888 287.780.993 382.462.220  620.328.066 395.477.978 272.898.794 113.204.360   
              
D&A 90.000.000 144.000.000 207.000.000 252.000.000  252.000.000 162.000.000 108.000.000 45.000.000   
              
EBiT 266.880 46.770.888 80.780.993 130.462.220  368.328.066 233.477.978 164.898.794 68.204.360   
              
Income Taxes 
@38% 
101.414 17.772.937 30.696.777 49.575.644  139.964.665 88.721.632 62.661.542 25.917.657   
              
Net Income 165.466 28.997.951 50.084.216 80.886.576  228.363.401 144.756.346 102.237.253 42.286.703   
              
D&A 90.000.000 144.000.000 207.000.000 252.000.000  252.000.000 162.000.000 108.000.000 45.000.000   
              
CAPEX 1.080.000.000 1.260.000.000 900.000.000         
              
terminal value        468.000.000 216.000.000 252.000.000 180.000.000 
              
FCF -989.834.534 -1.087.002.049 -642.915.784 332.886.576  480.363.401 774.756.346 426.237.253 339.286.703 180.000.000 
              
DF @7,5% 1 0,935243149 0,874679748 0,818038242  0,280263264 0,262114297 0,245140601 0,229266067 0,214419519 
              
Disc CF -989.834.534 -1.016.611.220 -562.345.416 272.313.950  134.628.214 203.074.715 104.488.056 77.786.928 38.595.513 
 
